Isabella Park
One sentence summary: Escalating direct conflict would be a poor strategy for Israel, Iran, and neighboring countries, so the recent exchanges are unlikely to grow into a regional war.
Since Hamas invaded Israel on October 7, 2023, the Israel-Palestine region has been embroiled in conflict, with civilians on both sides of the conflict facing a humanitarian crisis. For the first six months, the Israel-Palestine conflict stayed relatively contained within Israeli borders, with minor flare-ups that failed to escalate further. This was until Israel conducted a strike on an Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria, on April 1, 2024, killing several high-ranking officers in the Iranian military. Iran quickly retaliated, and following the exchange of fire between Israel and Iran in the past month, there has been growing concern that this could lead to a wider conflict in the Middle East. However, given the military disadvantage of Iran, it would be unstrategic for the Iranian military to engage in direct combat. From the Israeli perspective, having troops on the ground would be a far less preferable option to strategic strikes that have historically proven effective. Further, considering the high economic stakes for neighboring Middle Eastern countries, it seems unlikely that the retaliatory strikes from Iran will escalate into a regional ground war.
Since October 8, 2023, there has been the possibility of Hezbollah, a Syrian militant group backed by Iran, inciting violence at the Israeli border. However, this concern shifted with the bombing of an Iranian embassy on April 1. The attack killed several generals, including the previous leader of the elite Quds forces in Syria and Lebanon. 12 days later, Iran responded with a barrage of over 300 drones and missiles on April 13, but failed to inflict substantial damage due to Israel’s robust air defense systems. The U.S., along with the G7 countries, soon imposed economic sanctions on the Iranian government and various military contractors, advising both sides not to retaliate further. Israel has publicly stated that it will independently decide its course of action, and it remains unclear how the country might react in the following weeks.
To understand why a direct assault is unlikely, it is crucial to examine Israeli motivations within the context of historical examples of retaliation. According to U.S. officials, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not predict such a large Iranian retaliation in response to its strike on the Iranian consulate. The New York Times reported that the IDF anticipated 60 to 70 projectiles in the worst-case scenario of a retaliatory strike from Iran. Clearly, the strike was not planned as an extreme provocation of the Iranian government; rather, considering past Israeli strikes on Iranian targets shows that this is not an isolated case. In 2018, Israel doubled its missile strikes on strategic targets in Syria to deter cooperation between the Assad regime and Iran, which was often facilitated through Iranian support for Hezbollah. Throughout the Syrian conflict, Iran conducted strikes on Israeli soil while Israel continued to target Iranian affiliates in Syria. Hence, it was not surprising when Israel shifted its strategy to further target Iranian leadership, starting with the assassination of Sayyed Razi Mousavi (a high-ranking Iranian general) on December 25, 2023, followed by strikes on high-ranking soldiers. The most recent strike also followed the pattern of previous strikes on military leaders outside of Iranian territory. In the wider context of the Iran-Israel proxy conflict, the Israeli strike does not warrant a sudden escalation to direct warfare.
Analyzing Iranian motivations for its retaliation can also show that the main purpose of the strike was its political messaging. According to Iran and regional allies, it supposedly gave neighboring countries and other relevant actors a warning 72 hours in advance. Although this claim is contested, the targeting of military sites by Iranian missiles shows that the focus was damaging the reputation of the Iron Dome’s ability to protect military assets. The Iron Dome is a complex system of air defense mechanisms in Israel; it only failed to intercept 75 projectiles from Iran’s strike, most of which were eventually downed. Given that Iran lacks this defensive advantage, Israeli strikes have been disproportionately effective in targeting Iranian leaders. Successfully damaging Israeli military targets by penetrating the Iron Dome using a barrage of projectiles would have greatly benefited the image of Iranian military strength. The 12-day gap between Israel’s strike and the Iranian retaliation also gave the IDF ample time to strengthen its aerial defense capacity. It is clear that Iran’s retaliatory strike was meant to bolster its military image rather than inflict damage on Israeli territory, and so further escalation is unlikely.
Considering the possible outcomes of a direct war between Israel and Iran also shows how it would be unstrategic for both sides to engage in such a conflict. As seen from the extremely limited damage that Iran was able to inflict on Israel due to the Iron Dome, it would be near-impossible for Iran to win through aerial strikes. On the other hand, Israel was able to strike a battery in a city crucial to the Iranian nuclear program on April 19 with a fraction of the firepower Iran used. This is why the vast majority of Iranian proxy activity has been conducted through funding Hezbollah with resources instead of engaging in drone or aerial warfare. If the conflict involved troops on the ground, both sides would also face extreme damage. The IDF has already been stretched thin because of the guerilla nature of Hamas; if Iran used Hezbollah in similar ways, Israeli civilians would face further violence and instability. Iran has also experienced the chaos of war within its territory through the Gulf Wars and American involvement, which destabilized its economy for decades. Neither side is likely to engage directly on each other’s territory with troops.
Neighboring Middle Eastern allies would also refuse to become directly involved in balancing ideological stances with economic motivations. Historically, Middle Eastern countries have rejected Israeli statehood due to religious reasons, starting with the Israel Independence War, also known as the Nakba. However, countries have begun efforts to normalize relations with Israel, given their increasing economic prospects and reliance on Israeli imports and exports. An example is Jordan, which heavily relies on nearly 100 million cubic meters of Israeli water exports a year due to its status as one of the most water-scarce countries. The United Arab Emirates has also increased economic cooperation to support its growth as a hub for technology, which could greatly benefit from working with the advanced Israeli technological industry. This means that even if Israel and Iran started to engage in active combat, neighboring countries would be discouraged from explicitly supporting one side. If they supported Iran, they would risk jeopardizing existing ties to Israel and put crucial industries in danger of lacking imports and resources. On the other hand, supporting Israel would significantly compromise ideological positions that could also lead the government to lose popular support. Given that only 15 percent of Jordanians would support explicit economic cooperation with Israel, military aid would likely incite significant unrest within the country. Even in the worst-case scenario where Iran and Israel decide to engage in all-out war, the violence is unlikely to expand into a regional conflict.
Ultimately, the best-case scenario is that the exchanges between Israel and Iran end with the recent Israeli strike on Iranian batteries. Not only would this be strategic for both sides’ political and military interests, but it would also prevent unnecessary civilian casualties. Fortunately, it seems unlikely that the two countries and neighboring states will devolve into a full conflict that threatens not only their economic and military interests, but also the lives of countless civilians in the region.




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