By: Andrew Liu
As Europe and China compete for EV market share, Northvolt’s bankruptcy raises questions about government intervention in emerging markets.
Northvolt’s website is nearly perfect. It features videos of smiling scientists in the lab, footage of new gigafactories being built, and corporate cleanliness, all behind the bold web title “MAKE OIL HISTORY.” Amid the bright colors, it’s easy to miss the yellowish popup at the top of the screen. In muted font, it not only indicates Northvolt’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy but also a story that extends far past the company itself.
Much like its website, Northvolt’s story is mired in a common theme of overconfidence. In 2016, two former Tesla employees founded the company on a rallying cry of revolutionizing the green energy market. Besides battery production, they staked their success on developing a distinctly European value chain where the full lifecycle of their product would stay in the EU. By partnering with European car manufacturers, they hoped to do this by linking everything from lithium conversion to EV deployment. In this, their timing seemed perfect. By the late 2010s the EU had already established itself as a leader in climate action: policies like the European Green Deal were some of the most ambitious in the world. Yet, amidst such high floating goals, by the late 2010s the EU was lagging behind in the speed of battery and sustainable development implementation of countries like China. A revolutionary and innovative company was needed to rekindle the European renewable energy industry along with European sustainable development as a whole, and as a savvy new tech company, Northvolt’s overconfidence perfectly fit this profile. Unsurprisingly, investors were drawn like moths to the light. Starting from $12 million in seed funding, Northvolt would amass several billion dollar contracts with BMW and Volvo by 2019, along with hundreds of millions in loans from European investment banks. After adding a final 5 billion dollar “Green” loan from a group of European investment banks in 2024, Northvolt became one of the most well-funded startups in the world.
However, due to timeline decisions and its funding structure, Northvolt’s eventual $12 billion dollar valuation was never a reflection of the company’s actual stability. To start, Northvolt engaged in a build-first profit-later strategy that was intensely ambitious, even compared to other tech startups. In fact, the corporation planned to construct six major battery-producing gigafactories in a time span of less than 5 years. For some context, China’s leading electric car and battery manufacturer BYD took multiple decades to develop similar battery manufacturing processes and quality control. Moreover, Northvolt was unable to extend its projected timeline because its financing decisions had boxed the company into a corner. Most of Northvolt’s funding came from loans, leading to crippling debt from the onset. The plan was to pay off these loans using billion-dollar car contracts from manufacturers hoping to break into the EV space. However, these car contracts themselves, such as the one with BMW, were contingent on consistent battery deliveries. Any factory construction or manufacturing disruption would derail battery production timing and sink the whole company.
Seeing the tight window that Northvolt had created for themselves, it isn’t surprising that a few delays—almost certainly due to the rushed development process—were what led to the company’s bankruptcy. Although they were able to start battery production in their first gigafactory, technical issues prevented the factory from reaching full production. Much less than the proposed six factories at full production with only one fully operational gigafactory, Northvolt was unable to meet target quotas. Before long, BMW pulled out of its major contract with Northvolt, and Volvo ended up buying out the shared battery venture. With profit sources gone and immense debt, Northvolt’s bankruptcy last November had become inevitable.
It’s easy to oversimplify when looking back on the Northvolt saga, specifically when asking who to blame. Contained in a purely European context, a first glance suggests that Northvolt’s downfall was solely the result of internal mistakes. However, both Northvolt’s growth and fall were part of a larger narrative, that of the EV battle between Europe and China. It’s undeniable that Northvolt represented a European bid to control the battery market, the last step between existing domestic car manufacturers and a fully European EV value chain. As a result, it can be useful to look at the differences between the European and Chinese economic environments and how these differences may have affected Northvolt’s outcome.
Certainly, differences in creating economies of scale between Europe and China affected Northvolt’s ability to compete against Chinese battery manufacturers. As mentioned before, a certain part of Northvolt’s issues came from an overly ambitious timeframe. However, at the same time, it is critical to note that creating economies of scale is fundamentally easier in China than it is in Europe. With a much larger working population, the cost of labor is far cheaper in China than it is in a country like Sweden, allowing more funding to go towards growth. The support of entrepreneurship by the Chinese government as well as access to capital allows Chinese companies to take the lead. Moreover, China doesn’t have as many labor protections, leading to exploitative working conditions that empirically make it easier to grow production.
While differences in creating economies of scale between China and the EU affected Northvolt’s manufacturing growth, interest rate environments were another difference that instead affected the company’s financing. One of the cruxes in the Northvolt story was the company’s immense debt, which was exacerbated by the high interest rates of European loans. Since China’s economic system is more state-run than a majority of other developed countries, its central bank employs less strict policies within its banking. Along with China’s broader deflationary trends, government mediation has led to China having a far lower interest rate than Europe. Consequently, loans taken out in Europe have had a greater incentive to be paid off earlier. Debts grow faster in Europe, and this contributed to Northvolt’s critical mistake of a rushed growth timeline.
Lastly, Northvolt’s failure represents a difference between European and Chinese government intervention. Specifically, when China entered the EV space, it saw its companies as vehicles that would bring China to the global stage. In this, China’s economic environment is one where the government intervenes with the free market far more willingly. The result was that BYD received billions of dollars in subsidies, cash that propelled it through development, and it wouldn’t have to pay back. In contrast, although Europe saw the potential in Northvolt, the European economic environment simultaneously views the free market as more important than global dominance. Instead of offering Northvolt subsidies, the EU gave Northvolt loans that it would need to repay. In the end, the EU’s loans only added to the pressure that led to Northvolt’s bankruptcy. Ultimately, although internal mistakes contributed greatly to Northvolt’s downfall, its economic environment in the EU also severely affected its ability to grow and compete. As a result, its story serves as a case study for the importance of differences in domestic environments when analyzing companies that compete in global markets.





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