By: Isabella Park
The new Syrian government will have to navigate balancing different interests while protecting civilian access to basic needs and rights.
On December 8, rebels stormed into Bashar al-Assad’s luxury palace. This marked the downfall of the Syrian dictator whose reign had lasted more than half a century, leaving more than half a million civilians dead or wrongfully imprisoned throughout those years. While such a victory should be celebrated for the freedom of Syrian civilians, this liberation will not automatically lead to an independent and functioning governing authority. The United States will have to relinquish ideas of direct intervention in Syria, instead providing requested assistance for forming autonomous democratic and civil institutions, for the country to succeed in post-conflict nation-building.
The Assad regime has ruled Syria since 1971 when Hafez al-Assad established a sovereign state following decades of political instability. After he died in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad took office, with his authoritarian regime receiving military support from Iran and Russia. Syria was one of the many countries that saw protests as part of the wider Arab Spring in 2011; while Iran and Russian intervention in 2015 helped keep Assad in power, Syria has been embroiled in a civil war since. In this conflict, over half a million civilians died while millions of refugees were displaced and thousands arbitrarily detained in inhumane political prisons. While the international community expected the regime to fall within a few years of the Arab Spring, it was only on November 30, 2024 that a rebel coalition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (an Islamist group with roots in Al Qaeda) started seizing northern cities. By December 8, they reached the capital and Assad secretly fled to Russia to seek asylum. One of the largest reasons for the operation’s success was Assad’s weakened army. Compared to the rebels who had drones for strategic strikes, Assad’s soldiers were barely paid $30 a month while most of the soldiers were conscripts reliant on inadequate gear and food.
Although the fall of the Assad regime is an event to celebrate for millions of Syrians, the resulting power vacuum raises questions about the future of the country. In the past, countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, and Somalia have all seen terrorist groups exploiting state fragilities to assert political and military control. This is a likely possibility in Syria given the wide range of opposition factions. Furthermore, Assad was Alawite (a minority Shia Muslim group); as he labeled Sunnis terrorists to garner support from his own voter base, Alawite civilians will now face increased retaliatory violence. Beyond domestic turmoil, power dynamics across the Middle East will shift. Many Arab monarchies in the Gulf tolerated the Assad regime, and Russia further used bases in Syria to supply its Africa Corps. Yet unlike in 2015 when Russia and Iran actively assisted Assad in maintaining legitimacy, they did not interfere in December. Regardless of whether this was strategic or unavoidable due to resource constraints, this failure to help will not benefit their image of power. Russia and Iran’s legitimacy or image of power in the region will be significantly limited as a result of this successful overthrow. On the other hand, Turkey actively backed the Syrian rebels; the rebels’ success could grant Turkey more influence in the region.
Domestically, opposition forces in Syria must balance the different influences while ultimately creating a sustainable democracy. While Hayat Tahrir al-Sham would intuitively have the most power in the new coalition government, the group’s jihadist roots and connections to Al-Qaeda cannot be ignored. Fortunately, its leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani has conceded this shortcoming, creating more space for inclusive nation-building. The more practical aspects of how such a government could be established can be found in the 2012 Geneva Communique Resolution 2254, a plan for post-conflict nation-building proposed as people assumed Assad would fall in the near future. There were a few points specifically emphasized in the resolution: restoring civil rights and establishing a clear timetable for action. One of the first action items would be releasing politically detained individuals, a process which has already started as civilians have exposed secret prisons and freed family members. To further dismantle the oppression of free speech and dissent that was a core part of Syria’s political system for decades, another step would be preserving journalistic freedom, especially for foreign journalists to document any potential government corruption. Creating a norm for travel and accountability would intuitively be accompanied by freedom of entry for humanitarian aid organizations. Syria consists of numerous splintered groups, ranging from different Islamic sects to ethnic minorities, with the wide range of rebel factions further endangering any coalition government’s legitimacy. Any government will have to unite the divided country under the ideals of freedom and equality, two values that were obliterated under the Assad regime. Tolerating diverse policies and establishing a government that does not favor one ethnic or religious group will inspire support from civilians. The practical actions mentioned above will also improve the quality of life for civilians, generating trust from even seemingly marginalized groups in the new government.
On January 29, Ahmed al-Sharaa was appointed as the transitional period, with his primary responsibility being the creation of an inclusive legislative council leading up to the creation of a new constitution. As Abu Mohammed al-Julani was his nom de guerre, this means that the leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) now has official authority over the new government. Part of this transitional period will be the dissolution of any militias or factions that were involved in the civil war, integrating them into future state institutions. While the rebuilding of new institutions is a positive sign for the Syrian political system, Sharaa has emphasized that a new constitution will need three years and an election four years to complete. To address the issue of various sectors and interests in the Syrian populace, he also plans to host a national dialogue conference. It is yet unclear if Julani’s rebranding from a rebel leader to a legitimate leader of a democratic state will be successful, especially given the intrinsically substantial level of influence HTS will have in this new government.
The United States has not been very successful in past instances of post-conflict nation-building. In the case of Iraq in 2003, Washington adopted a unilateral approach to decision-making, leaving Iraqi civilians powerless to influence the process. The detached nature of the bureaucrats and civilians involved also meant that the American policymakers did not comprehend the past failures of Britain in creating mandatory territories. They also completely dissolved the problematic Ba’ath party, the ruling political organization under both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad that had dominated Syria’s government for decades, leaving thousands of civilians without basic utilities as the lower-level bureaucrats disappeared. Yet the biggest issue with such intervention was that American actions were perceived as neocolonialistic, which would repeat in Syria under former President Biden’s policy of a pro-Western coalition. While the United States should serve as a guiding figure, Russia and Iran’s failure to interfere in the process of revolution shows that they also are not likely to intervene in the creation of political institutions. Trying to overly exert Western influence could incite a response in retaliation, but unprovoked action seems highly improbable. In this specific scenario, President Trump’s statements that he would not intervene seem preferable over Biden’s more interventionist position.
The complex domestic fracturing in Syria as well as its intertwined foreign allies will create difficulties in post-conflict nation-building. Although Syria’s transitional government has potentially potent plans to address past shortcomings, its inevitable ties to the HTS could impede its ability to fully and equitably encompass all relevant interests. In overcoming such obstacles, the new government and international community should focus on rebuilding institutions and guaranteeing basic rights and needs; not only do Syrian citizens morally deserve this following the Assad regime, but past failures show that civilian satisfaction is key to long-term stability.





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