By: David Song
The tariff will shield European automakers from the full extent of Chinese competition, giving them leeway to adapt and become competitive with Chinese companies during the transformation from gas to electric.
The European automotive market is known for its presence of premium and luxury vehicles, with leading manufacturers like Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Audi dominating the share of the automotive market. It is rapidly transitioning toward electric vehicles (EVs) as national governments push for stricter environmental regulations and sustainability goals, making Europe one of the largest markets for EVs globally.
Chinese automakers have long since abandoned trying to compete with European gas cars. Instead, they began investing into EV’s in the early 2000s. Today, the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) market is the world’s largest, driven by domestic manufacturers like BYD, NIO, and Xpeng, and supported by substantial government incentives, infrastructure development, and growing consumer demand for green alternatives. The Chinese government subsidized these companies in the form of grants, loans from state sponsored banks, tax credits, and inadequate material costs; coupled with China’s manufacturing prowess and Chinese public policy, these subsidies fueled rapid innovation and production within the market. A significant portion of the EV sales are in exports. With the US barricaded off by Trump’s 100 percent tariffs on various Chinese products, EVs included, China has turned to Europe’s auto industry.
On September 13th of 2023, the President of the European Commission announced an investigation on China’s suspected illegal government subsidization of Battery Electric Vehicle companies. In October of 2024, the investigation concluded that the Chinese BEV value chain benefitted illegally from government subsidies, and the bloc voted to set down definitive BEV tariffs of 17 percent for BYD, 18.8 percent for Geely, and 35.3 percent for other “non-cooperating companies.” Chinese officials and businesses argued that the timeframe given, 13 months, was insufficient, and criticized the tariffs as “protectionist.” Indeed, these tariffs very much are aimed to save the EU’s declining auto sector. At the same time, the EU knows that shutting out Chinese competition completely is not in the Union’s best interest. Rather, the tariff fits into the EU’s broader goal of carbon neutrality, shielding European automakers from the full extent of Chinese competition and affording them just enough leeway to adapt and become competitive with Chinese companies during the transformation from gas to electric.
The tariffs come at a time of struggle for the European car making industry. Volkswagen and Ford Global have steadily declined, to the point where Volkswagen has been forced to close three factories and Ford forced to lay off 4000 workers. Part of the reason is the stringent fines imposed by the EU on carbon emissions. But perhaps a bigger reason comes from outside the EU. Not only are Chinese BEV’s suffocating competition in the European mainland, they are also slowly dragging down European car sales, both gas and electric, in mainland China. Whereas older generations of Chinese citizens had preferred the established, luxury European carmakers, younger generations now perceive BYD, Geely, and other Chinese EV companies as equally respectable, while also being far more financially appealing. Furthermore, demand for green alternatives has burgeoned in China’s highly polluted cities, increasing the value of Chinese EVs. As such, the share of European automakers in the Chinese automotive market has declined rapidly; German companies, for example, have lost 10 percent of China’s car market the last five years.
Understanding the EU’s motivation requires first understanding the European and Chinese economies. The EU serves to regulate the European economy. The single market emphasizes open competition under rules, and it is this fierce competition that motivates fair and equal pricing. The EU market is diverse in needs, customers, goods, and services; the multi-sector focus prevents any one industry from receiving too much support. Despite the focus on fairness, disparate wealth inequality exists between member countries. Labor and production costs, as well as an emphasis on quality, have gentrified the automobile industry, hindering the provisioning of automobiles in less developed countries.
The Chinese government, on the other hand, plays a much more involved role in managing and directing the economy. Consolidation of power enables quick decisions, and rapid policy change. State-owned enterprises are benefited by aggressive subsidies and ensured debt financing from state banks. Unlike the EU, the Chinese government picks and chooses which sectors to boost, and which to let fail. Chinese companies can survive on low profit margins because of government support, scale, low worker wages, and resource access. In fact, many Chinese companies own their supply chain, a form of vertical integration. As such, it’s nearly impossible for European companies to compete with Chinese backed EVs, because European companies cannot set prices as low as Chinese companies can while still being profitable.
The growth of the Chinese EV industry is not self-sustaining; if it were, China would have no interest in exporting on such scales. The EU is aware of China’s need for exports. It knows that if China cannot find ways around the tariffs, China will accept them so long as they do not completely compromise profits. Because of low profit margins, Chinese businesses likely will not be able to take on the extra tax. The duty will instead fall to the European importers, who will have no choice but to raise the price of the imported EVs, thus reducing the competitiveness of Chinese EVs in the European market. While they will still be cheaper than European brands, this may be just enough to keep European carmakers alive.
Nevertheless, the EU finds itself in a very precarious position. Set the tariffs too high, and they risk retaliation from China. Too low, and they may not be enough to save European companies. Additionally, setting targeted tariffs such as these gives the EU an additional burden of enforcement. The primary reason why the US tariffs did not have their desired effect was because they failed to shut out Chinese products. China routed its products to Mexico, where they were trucked up, circumventing the tariffs completely and incurring additional transportation and supply chain cost burdens on importers. The EU risks overlooking similar economic loopholes, which certainly do exist, and China can be counted on to find them. If carried out with caution, the tariff plans may well be what enables Europe to return to being at least competitive with the booming Chinese car market.





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