By: Isabella Park
The Israel-Hamas ceasefire is vulnerable to political destabilization due to the uncertainty and chronological separation of its phases.
Since Hamas invaded Israel in October 2023, a ceasefire has been touted by the United Nations Security Council as the ultimate solution to hostilities. Yet it has always seemed impossible, with smaller-scale ceasefires often disturbed by outside forces like Hezbollah. Although a successful ceasefire has been reached and honored for the past 30 days, this does not guarantee an end to the conflict. While the ceasefire agreement itself is adequate in achieving a de-escalation of violence, it is vulnerable to the complex political situations of both Israel and Hamas if the pressing question of how Gaza will be governed continues to be ignored.
The Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement was reached January 19, 2025, putting a long-awaited pause on the 15-month-long conflict which has ravaged civilians since October 2023. It consists of three separate phases lasting six weeks, each of which are intended to eventually culminate in a long-term peace arrangement between Israel and Palestine. All three phases require the equal cooperation and commitment of both parties. The first phase is already underway, involving the exchange of non-combatant hostages and prisoners. 33 Israeli hostages, including women, children, elderly, and wounded, should be released by the end of six weeks, as well as hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. As part of the first phase, Israel plans to withdraw its military from prominent Gazan cities, which will allow many northern Gazan refugees to return to their homes. Most importantly, this has allowed significantly more humanitarian aid to enter Gaza; since difficulty of access was a critical issue in the past, this will tangibly improve living conditions for Gazans. But as each hostage release is accompanied by a week-long period in between, only one cohort of hostages and prisoners have been returned at this time. The latter two phases have only been discussed in principle, and are not under a binding agreement. The second phase would involve the return of all hostages and prisoners regardless of demographics, mostly young men. Israel has expressed interest in considering the war concluded as part of the second phase. The third and final phase would include the exchange of all bodies and a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Intuitively, the complete conclusion of violence would be followed by extensive rebuilding efforts in Gaza.
Although this ceasefire might seem to guarantee a long-term peace arrangement, it is important to note that the latter two phases, which would result in tangible steps towards demilitarization, have yet to be agreed upon in practice. The larger issue then, is whether or not the current conditions of fragile peace will continue for eighteen weeks. The ceasefire agreement was accompanied by an enforcement mechanism based in Cairo which includes the United States, Egypt, and Qatar as moderators. Tensions arose on January 25 when Israel accused Hamas of refusing to return the final living Israeli civilian and responded by refusing reentry to refugees in Northern Gaza. The conflict resolution body based in Cairo successfully settled the issue within one day; clearly, bilateral relationships are not the primary issue. Israel itself has been divided over the ceasefire agreement, even though Phase 1 is the most moderate phase out of the three proposed, with no active steps taken towards demilitarization. Despite that, Itamar Ben-Gvir, the Israeli security minister, resigned over the deal and Prime Minister Netanyahu has appealed to both wings of his government by hinting at the possibility of continuing violence if needed. Israel also sent police to parade in the streets of Gaza despite the ceasefire agreement, showing that the ceasefire is not necessarily an expression of peace from Israel.
Another issue is the lack of an internationally recognized governing body in Palestine. Israel is highly unlikely to work with Hamas as a negotiating party in the future, which means that any advancement beyond Phase 1 might not be plausible. Israel and many other foreign nations would likely call for the replacement of Hamas with a non-militant group before recognizing the possibility of coexistence. However, it is unclear whether there is a realistic alternative to Hamas given the Palestinian Authority’s decline. Currently, Hamas governs all non-governmental organization involvement, utilities, and public sector payments in Gaza. Beyond military involvement, it is practically the only functioning governing body in Palestine. The Palestinian Authority (PA), the original governing body, has seen years of declining effectiveness and approval due to its ineffectiveness in preventing Israeli encroachment. Its image of weakness was precisely why Hamas skyrocketed in popularity at the beginning of the conflict, as many Gazans believed Hamas was taking definite action against Israel, unlike the PA. However, Hamas has been significantly weakened recently; Mohammed al-Deif, the leader of its military sector, was confirmed to be dead months after an Israeli military report. Despite the series of successful Israeli offensives against Hamas officials, its rocket arsenal is relatively hidden. While Hamas offered cooperation to the PA, they refused to work in a coalition-style body. Hence, the future of Palestine’s government is concerningly uncertain. Hamas cannot maintain permanent control without driving away investment and support from Arab states, yet removing Hamas would result in a significant power vacuum that could invite new militant groups to seize power.
These deficiencies do not bode well for the last group of hostages in Phase 1. Fourteen refugees are still beholden to the rapidly shifting political climate, while others included in Phase 2 might not be returned at all if Israel and Hamas fail to engage in successful negotiations. In the long term, it is also unclear how both sides can work toward a stable society in Gaza. While this ceasefire is an improvement from previous hostilities, it is clear that it does not take any concrete steps toward any form of long-term solution. It focuses largely on ceasing hostilities and avoids the significantly more controversial issue of a post-conflict future. Even if this ceasefire holds, Israel and Hamas cannot continue to ignore the question of what Gaza will look like beyond this war. Otherwise, no peace achieved will last.





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