By: Bruce Ru
Macron’s high-profile 2025 China visit showcased symbolic “celebrity diplomacy” but ultimately underscored the EU’s declining economic leverage, fragmented strategy, and need for unified, pragmatic re-industrialization to negotiate effectively with a more competitive China.
French president Emmanuel Macron’s December 2025 visit to China epitomized celebrity diplomacy. From Ping-Pong duels with World Cup athletes to speeches in front of enamored college students to promises of Giant Pandas for Paris, Macron’s telegenic reception by Chinese chairman Xi Jinping brought messages of mutual understanding, economic fairness, and “a shared future for humanity” to global audiences.
However, Macron’s trip fell short on most of his diplomatic objectives. The visit aimed to balance EU-Chinese trade and pressure China to help bring about a ceasefire in Ukraine, but Macron failed to reach any landmark agreement with his Chinese counterpart. Despite bringing a large delegation of leading French corporations, he was unable to bring about an investment pact or a promise that China would import more French goods to reduce the EU’s trade deficit. China’s much-awaited order of 500 Airbus planes also never materialized as Beijing preferred to strike a deal with Boeing, Airbus’s U.S. competitor. As for Ukraine, China neither changed its stance toward Russia nor called for a ceasefire in any of its post-visit communiqués. In fact, Beijing continues to offer indirect economic and technical support to Moscow. As a result, the two nations’ 12-point agreement was mostly symbolic.
The visit’s limited success highlights France and the EU’s declining competitiveness in a global economy defined by Chinese overcapacity and American protectionism as European nations struggle to advance a convincing diplomatic agenda in their favor. Only through nuanced de-risking efforts and EU-wide unity can European nations regain a footing. In this process, Europe must understand its structural weaknesses before seeking a collective solution.
Macron was unlikely to achieve major concessions from the outset, as he began negotiations in an underdog position. As China’s share in global manufacturing increased from 5% in 1995 to 35% by the early 2020s, European nations restructured their economies to rely on cheap Chinese goods to reduce costs for businesses and consumers. Meanwhile, they relied on their comparative advantage in high-tech manufacturing like renewable energy and pharmaceuticals to prop up their industry. However, China’s recent progress in sectors like solar farming, electric vehicles, and artificial intelligence has begun to overtake the EU’s advanced industry. In September 2025 alone, Chinese exports to the EU rose by 14%. This imbalance, alongside China’s low imports due to a post-COVID economic slowdown, has led to a EU-China trade deficit of $357 billion, plunging Europe into recession and de-industrialization. For instance, Germany, Europe’s largest economy, has contracted for two consecutive years. Though the EU has attempted to mitigate the damage through tariffs such as its EV duties up to 35.3% in October 2024, such measures have triggered retaliation from China, who slapped tariffs on European brandy and pork the following year. Moreover, Trump’s trade war closed off the United States as the EU’s most important market accounting for 20% of its exporting revenue. As a result, Macron landed in China in a near-desperate position, giving Xi an advantage from the start.
Macron’s unsuccessful outcomes also expose the EU’s ineffective negotiating strategy, which overestimates its leverage over China. During the visit, Macron described China’s trade advantage as coercive, threatening “strong measures” in retaliation. This accusation ignores the fact that European consumers and businesses themselves are drawn to China’s low prices, in large part thanks to the latter’s industrial policy subsidizing high-tech industries. As a result, EU leaders’ demands annoy Beijing as interfering with domestic decisions, damaging the goodwill to reach an agreement. After all, the Chinese government has every right to support its industries for the benefit of its own citizens. Moreover, a key pillar of Macron’s agenda is to secure Chinese investment into France, reversing Europe’s traditional role as a provider of foreign direct investment for China from the 1980s and 1990s onward. Such a transition is unrealistic because corporations could manufacture goods at both a higher quality and a lower price in China than in the EU. The German automobile giant Volkswagen offered a telling example in 2024 when it sold operations to Xinjiang since production there occurred at a fraction of the cost. In December 2025, Volkswagen closed its iconic factory in Dresden, the first time the 88-year-old company closed a domestic plant. In light of these developments, Macron’s trip wasn’t the only one that exposed the EU’s declining clout — recent state visitors to China from King Felipe IV of Spain to EU Commissioner Ursula Von der Leyen also left with limited results. Thus, to stand a chance at achieving an economic agreement, European leaders must shed their post-imperial arrogance and adopt a pragmatic negotiating approach with China.
Ultimately, to step up their competitiveness, EU members must compromise and find unity to re-industrialize, diversify supply chains, and obtain forceful economic negotiating positions. Currently, the EU’s member states exhibit diverging economic priorities. The French, plagued by internal instability, strives to reduce its trade imbalance with China accounting for 46% of its total deficits, whereas Germany, with larger industrial capacity and investment links to China, is more open to trade. Meanwhile, Eastern European nations near Ukraine are willing to make economic sacrifices for security guarantees from the U.S., while others, like Hungary, pursue deeper ties with China and Russia. For this reason, the EU struggles to adopt a coherent diplomatic position as seen by Beijing’s refusal to take Macron seriously. To bridge these differences, the EU must set aside its internal differences to collaborate on solutions. Member states must pursue EU-wide legislation to increase onshore production in strategic industries like semiconductors and clean tech, such as the European Chips Act pledging to expand semiconductor output by 2030. They must also coordinate with their international network of allies, from Francophone Africa to South Asia, to procure minerals and value-added production without relying on China. Similarly, they will need to collectively respond to any Chinese economic aggression, whether that entails imposing tariffs or prosecuting intellectual property violations.
However, de-risking does not necessitate animosity. Even when globalization takes a bleak direction, success stories of European-Chinese cooperation, from Chinese robots in Paris’s de Gaulle Airport to nuclear energy research partnerships, demonstrate that competition offers more than a zero-sum game. European nations must look to China as a source of technical know-how, two-way investment, and cultural exchange. In the process of tapping China’s tremendous financial and human capital, the EU must couple negotiations with geopolitical nuance. Rather than nagging Chinese leaders with unrealistic demands on Ukraine or Taiwan, Europe should step up military spending and cooperation to build tangible suasion. Only by committing to self-strengthening can Europe defend its interests when China develops quicker than ever while U.S. tariffs test the limits of the Transatlantic Alliance.
To Macron’s disappointment, giant pandas and presidential ping-pong would not by themselves reverse the EU’s economic decline. On the contrary, shedding some of its post-colonial grandeur will allow France and its peers to introspect their weaknesses, engage in effective diplomacy, and discover pragmatic solutions in a new global order where competition and multilateralism share an uneasy co-existence.





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