By: Eloise Malle
India’s new labour codes, while framed as modernization to boost growth and ease business, are internally contradictory, weaken worker protections, and fail to address deeper structural economic problems like low demand, weak enforcement, and inadequate investment.
“The laws will benefit only the employers and not workers like us. These words were spoken by Akashdeep Singh, a worker employed on the outskirts of Delhi, when asked for his opinions on India’s new Labour Code Reforms while attending a protest. An undisputed fact about the Indian economy was that it was far too bureaucratic and needed a significant shift. The original economy was based upon 29 codes, originating from a post-imperial time, having rarely ever been changed, despite the evolving economy. The new labour codes in question, ratified after five years of negotiating and contention, starting in 2019, consist of four codes: the Code on Wages, 2019, the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, the Code on Social Security, 2020, and the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020. This shift in economic policy aimed to modernize outdated codes, support workers’ rights, simplify compliance, and institutionalize temporary employment. However, these acts were met with much backlash due to their limited impact on the economy, their contradictory nature, and the belief that they didn’t adequately support workers. Although they were introduced to modernize an excessively bureaucratic system and support workers’ rights, India’s labour codes not only fail to meaningfully protect workers but were also promoted under the misleading narrative that they would drive economic growth, while ignoring deeper structural constraints such as low demand, weak enforcement, and inadequate private investment.
Despite the significance of these codes and their purpose of simplification, many have found them lacking coherence. Professor Pangariya, when writing for the Times of India, described the laws by saying that “You could not implement 100% of the Indian labour laws without violating 20% of them. The nature of these acts is inherently paradoxical, as they argue that their purpose is to support workers’ rights; however, they allow for fewer regulations on firing. Earlier, factories with 100 or more workers needed the government’s permission before they could lay off employees. Now, that threshold has been increased to 300. This idea directly opposes the original purpose of these acts to support workers’ rights and made members of trade unions describe the new legislation as the most”sweeping and aggressive abrogation of workers’ hard-won rights and entitlements since [India’s] independence”. Therefore, by nature, these acts can be viewed as ineffective and lacking authority due to their contradictory nature.
Although these codes were needed to systemize and adapt to the growing technology and fluidity in Indian business culture, the argument that convinced most to sign off on the agreement was the claim that these codes would facilitate business expansion and attract foreign investment. Prime Minister Narendra Modi even articulated this when referring to the codes as promoting the “ease of doing business” with India, arguing that they would promote productivity and international growth. Additionally, former Labour Secretary Sumita Dawra even argued that they would enhance competitiveness and “attract more investments”. However, not only will these shifts have little impact on the economy and global trade, but their contradictory nature makes them unlikely to be respected. It is important to streamline one’s economy and support one’s working class, but doing so in the belief that it will lead to economic growth and prosperity is excessively optimistic.
Additionally, the issues with the Indian economy and its ties to foreign trade are more deeply rooted and cannot be solved through simple shifts in the structure of the workforce. Economists like Prof Arun Kumar argue that labour restrictions alone do not explain the factors limiting India’s economic efficiency, decreased due to weak competitiveness or the slow private-sector investment in new factories. For example, India’s under-investment in infrastructure and the existence of the black economy demonstrate far larger risks. Ineffective investments and weakened state capacity are caused by the existence of this black economy, which continues to distort incentives through tax evasion, capital flight, and ineffective enforcement. Underinvestment in infrastructure has caused congested ports, slow transport, and weak warehousing, factors that discourage increased production and general growth and prosperity. The labour codes can therefore not fulfill the promise of economic growth for India, as all they do is arguably effectively address simple issues, while they do not promote and support the economy. Indian economists and politicians should focus on dealing with these structural problems, instead of holding five-year debates on imposing disconnected codes. As these issues continue to persist, it is unlikely to generate economic growth through the streamlining of codes.
“Inadequate private investment is not due to these laws but due to inadequate demand, as wages [in India] are low, so mass demand remains low,” Prof Kumar told the BBC. As economists consider the future of the economy in India, as we enter the 2026 cycle, their focus should be on the repercussions of the Trump tariffs and the effects these tariffs will have, or on the lack of private investment in India in general. Although it is crucial to streamline one’s economic system, bureaucratic streamlining, through contradictory codes, will have virtually no benefit and is not the most effective use of politicians’ time when their economy is about to face significant disruption.





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