By Kristen Ma

Despite record economic growth and expansive gender-equality legislation, Taiwan’s fertility rate has fallen to historic lows, revealing how entrenched social norms and rising costs can undermine even the most ambitious pronatalist policies.

From late 2025 to early 2026, Taiwan’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell to a historic nadir, dropping to just 0.72 births per woman to overtake South Korea’s measure of 0.748. Taiwan’s economy experienced a significant boom in 2025, driven chiefly by global artificial intelligence (AI) demand augmenting its crucial semiconductor sector. Its gross domestic product (GDP) is forecasted to grow 7.2-7.4%, the highest in years. Moreover, educational access for women has remained strong, with more women graduating from university than men in younger demographics after the Gender Equity Education Act was passed in 2004. This expansion of opportunity, however, comes with a tradeoff. As standards of living improve, the cost of raising children increases in tandem, and the likelihood of educated women delaying pregnancy increments as well. Consequently, Taiwan joins an alarming trend of East Asian nations exhibiting drastically low birth rates outpaced by death rates, giving rise to an aging population and alluding to further demographic concerns. 

While Taiwan’s economic landscape has shifted dramatically, its social norms have remained largely immutable. Traditional gender conventions dictate that in addition to employment, women are expected to perform domestic duties—including but not limited to housekeeping, cooking, and being the sole caregiver of children—beyond sustaining themselves financially. What’s more, women must be filial to their in-laws and behave subserviently to their husbands, further dissuading them from taking on added responsibilities—particularly one as taxing as raising kids. To attenuate these concerns, Taiwan has stipulated several pronatalist policies, among them the Gender Equality in Employment Act, Early Childhood Education and Care Act, the Employment Insurance Act, while subsidizing early education fees and newborn “birth grants.” Despite this, the Taiwanese birth and fertility rate has continued to plunge. It becomes apparent that the rate at which Taiwan’s child population is shrinking—which reflects a sustained decline in marriage and family formation—is indicative of prevailing, partial gender norms and is compounded by high housing and child-rearing costs. These nonstructural pressures should be viewed as equally consequential as lawmaking implements, offsetting gains made by direct pronatalist policies. 

Since the early 2000s, Taiwan has honed in on instituting pro-birthrate policies and reforms. Key legislative directives include the Gender Equality in Employment Act (GEEA) and Employment Insurance Act. The GEEA was passed in 2002 by Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (Parliament). Key amendments made up until 2024 fortified the prohibition of gender discrimination in recruitment, pay, promotion, and termination with regards to pregnancy and parental leave. Notably, employment discrimination cases and fines—totalling 43 lawsuits valued at $10 million USD as reported by RTI News—continue to exist, cultivating fears surrounding career penalties for parenthood. The Employment Insurance Act stipulated a cash benefit mechanism for parents who must take leave, providing them with an allowance equal to 60% of insured salary, disbursed monthly, for up to 6 months per child. However, families are frequently unable to afford to take parental leave despite the allowance. Hence, the act has faced scrutiny due to its durational limitations, with the public citing housing prices and stagnant wages as grounds for further rectification of the policy’s deficits. Given the inefficacy of the aforementioned pronatalist policies in reversing declining birthrates, it stands to reason that additional factors are at play–-economic and social determinants that continue to exacerbate the gap between legislative intent and measurable impact. 

Prior to the 1970s, women in economically-burgeoning East Asian countries were having five or more children. However, in the last 70 years, the fertility rate has been on the decline. Even in the most advanced economies, the TFR has averaged roughly 1.6 children per couple, compared to a replacement rate of 2.1. Generally, birth rates drop when a country experiences economic growth, where “improved standards of living bring down infant and child mortality” causing couples to “expect their children will live to adulthood,” and thus have fewer according to an article in The Atlantic. This has rung true empirically in Taiwan. At the end of the 2025 calendar year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that Taiwan’s GDP per capita had surged to roughly $41.6k USD, well above the global average of $15.28k. A global semiconductor boom led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) embodies Taiwan’s high-wage, and equal parts high-intensity tech economy. TSMC concentrated jobs in expensive urban hubs and careers necessitated increasingly long training. With it, housing and child investment costs rose; thus, births became easier to postpone or forgo. 

In addition to economic strains, social actors—being the dual burden of paid and unpaid work experienced by working women and gendered expectations at home—have manifested as primary deterrents of childbearing. The “second shift” is a term coined by Arlie Hochschild in her influential 1989 book, The Second Shift, to define the unpaid, often invisible labor of housework and childcare that working women perform following their paid jobs. This term is particularly applicable in Taiwan, where women shoulder a disproportionate amount of this “second shift,” accentuating the persistent gender inequality in domestic responsibility. Furthermore, in 2025, Taiwan recorded a catastrophic 16.35% drop in annual marriages, which has contributed to the already severe fertility crisis. This decline in marriages remains in conflict with Taiwan’s traditional cultural views, which contend that marriage is a precondition for having kids. In fact, only 4% of births in Taiwan are outside of wedlock, a figure that has remained constant for the past four decades. This statistic appertains to the stringent expectations modern married women endure in Taiwan. Such expectations comprise making a considerable amount of wealth, being able and willing to take on the majority of housework, being respectful toward in-laws, tolerant of their husbands’ extramarital affairs, and conforming to traditional metrics of beauty. In the face of these demands, many women have opted to pursue both education and employment, decreasing the likelihood of marriage and thus postponing family formation. 

Taiwan is a paradigm for the notion that effectuating policy does not necessitate legislative implementation. As the country continues to grapple with obfuscated antinatalist policies—that is, overwhelming childrearing costs and disparate gender norms—the burden on the federal government to raise birth rates is bifurcated: (1) it must incentivize childbearing by taking a more aggressive stance on funding/subsidizing housing, childcare, primary and secondary education, etc., while (2) dismantling ingrained, harmful gender conformities that pressure women to bear much of the familial responsibility. The latter requires much more intentioned, gradual change. 

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