Two weeks after the war broke out in Sudan, António Guterres, the secretary-general of the UN, confessed, “We failed [to stop the war in Sudan].” Three years after the war’s beginning, international actors looking to support Sudan are continuing to make the same mistakes made in its brewing phases, and those looking to benefit from it are doing so exponentially. Challenging the trajectory of Sudan requires adjusting the flawed means in which actors currently try to mediate by adopting the W.I.N.S. framework:
Work with civilian resistance committees and grassroots movements
Invest continually and specifically into civilian-led groups
Nullify external support and suppliers over introducing Sudan sanctions
Stand up for Sudan, and award it the media attention it deserves
Work with civilian resistance committees and grassroots movements
When senior international political figures and top-level UN officials touched Sudanese soil in 2019, they were welcomed by Sudanese grateful to be receiving recognition and aid with the governmental transition. Unfortunately, in this period the international community moved lethargically as it pertains to implementing opinions from civilian groups—like Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) a humanitarian network operating in Sudan that has the knowledge to reach the areas where international organizations can not, Women’s Emergency Response Rooms (WRR’s) which not only focus on sexual violence, but also give a needed lens that makes women’s grievances against the patterns of patriarchy in Sudan heard, and Neighborhood Resistance Committees (NRCs) groups of activists who play a key role in political organization from the bottom up—a grave mistake which ultimately deprived Sudan of the financial freedom and influence needed to ensure a stable transition. This crucial time was instead spent in international discord and overfocused on bridging the ideological gaps between Gen. Burhan and Hemedti. In doing so, the generals’ disagreements only developed further, as did what they both could gain from war. Even after the war’s beginning, “significant” mediation efforts like Saudi Arabia and the United States’ co-hosted 2023 Jeddah Talks could be truthfully labeled as counterproductive. Creating ceasefires that frankly just gave the warring parties space to recuperate their forces and then resume fighting, and abstract commitments that amounted to suggestions for the SAF and RSF without concrete legal restrictions—a product of the lack of civilian voice. As the conflict has evolved, other attempts at what’s claimed to be peace have arisen. Groups like the QUAD—a diplomatic coalition consisting of the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—have all failed to prioritize civilian interests over their own. However, recently, one mediation effort stood apart as a possible road map for those to come. The Berlin Conference took place on April 15, 2026, hosted by the Quintet—the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), the EU, and the UN. Though it fell short in addressing the support that international actors present in the room provide for the RSF and the SAF—the UAE is heavily linked to the former, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt to the latter—and even inviting them to the table in the first place. It did, however, give a seat to a civilian voice that had been suppressed for so long. Even if it may have been a skewed diagram of the heavily convoluted views Sudan resistance committees hold, it’s a start and a hopeful sign for the future.
Invest continually and specifically in civilian-led groups
“Once you start with an external intervention you must see it through right to the bitter end, with political support [and] financial support,” said Peter Schumann, an expert on UN missions in Sudan. Addressing universal funding cuts to Sudan is vital as its portrayal as a failed state intensifies, and forgetting, or better yet ignoring, the suffering of peoples is less demanding for countries. In 2024, the UN’s Humanitarian Needs Response Plan (HNRP) funding goal to assist vulnerable Sudanese was $2.7 billion dollars. The current goal set in 2025 is $4.2 billion, and as of April 11, 2026, only 10 percent has been donated. What seems like an arduous and taxing imposition now will become drastically larger if countries stall their support and watch as Sudan spirals out of control. An argument frequently made regarding the lack of financial attention to Sudan is crisis priorities (not to discredit either), but why then are Gaza and Ukraine receiving support disproportionate to their crises? As an international community, we are growing bolder in experimenting with the idea of selective humanitarianism, providing humanitarian assistance only when it has direct benefits or helps a certain type of people. Historically, it’s been no secret that this has often been the case in many international conflicts, but at the scale of disaster Sudan has reached, can we not oblige it to become a moral duty to see through what we started and support it fairly? A spotlight for action has been placed on Washington with this in mind. The U.S. is Sudan’s largest foreign aid donor, giving over 1 billion dollars in Fiscal Year 2024 (FY2024), but under President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy methodology, donations have been unstable. For example, in 2025, Trump announced a 90-day foreign aid freeze that extended past Sudan but affected its process significantly. Similarly, in early 2026, the U.S. only pledged an additional $200 million to the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, an $800 million dollar decrease from the previous years’ aid (FY 24+FY 25). More now than ever, the international community needs to financially support Sudan, and when that happens, instead of sending money to the UN and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) that can’t reach those in need expeditiously enough, it needs to be transferred to intermediaries to bypass restrictions that come with directly giving to grassroots. The implementation of monitoring aid flows must also be put in place to ensure funds go to these causes. This cash flow will allow civilian organizations to carry out their duties, consequently granting Sudanese civilians the stability they need. When the period opens up for civilian rule, the structure won’t crash or be overthrown as was the case in the 2019-2021 transitional period. Instead, the structure will provide a direct and sturdy pipeline that transitions power to the people.
Nullify external support and suppliers over introducing Sudan sanctions.
In the Sudanese war, “the most destabilizing factor remains the continued flow of external arms to belligerents[Gen. Burhan and Hemedti],” said Alexander Dent, Professor of Anthropology and International Affairs at The George Washington University, and I’m inclined to agree with him.
For this matter, focusing on the complex relationships and diverging views that halt progress within the QUAD is a great starting point. Though members of the QUAD deny negative involvement and present themselves as mediators, reports from the UN and Amnesty International have shown that they are, conversely, perpetrators supplying weapons for their respective sides. Each branch of the group has different reasons for supporting either the RSF or SAF. Whether it’s the immediate benefit in the exchange of weapons for smuggled gold or future benefits like Sudan’s alignment being either anti or pro-Islam, control of Red Sea ports and naval bases, agricultural land, influence on the Horn of Africa, and sustained benefits from gold and critical mineral mining. With that being said, how can a coalition claim to fight for peace if its members have clear reasons to reject it? It’s almost impossible to foster peace if everyone in the QUAD has competing motives, and if the QUAD really isn’t built to establish harmony, then it’s made for management and control. Frighteningly, this situation is evocative of Gen. Burhan and Hemedti’s continued forms of strategic manipulation. Once again, Washington sits in the hot seat. Successive Biden and Trump administrations, in fear of diminishing relationships with the Gulf states, have not tried to attack Abu Dhabi or Riyadh for their support. The US knows what its “allies” are doing and is actively prolonging the war to save its relationship. In lieu of this, Washington must come to a compromise and be willing to sacrifice aspects of its Gulf States alliances to attack their iniquitous aiding of the RSF and SAF. For this attack to be effective, the international community must adopt the terms of the US-proposed nationwide Sudan arms embargo, an important change to the previous arms embargo that only covers Darfur. Additionally, they must follow in the footsteps of Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), a US rights group, which called on the UN for the immediate placement of an arms embargo on the UAE. While a step in the right direction, it left a mark too small. If the UAE is deserving of an arms embargo, every party supplying armaments to either side of the war against the people should be punished with an arms embargo. Additionally, the embargo on Sudan should only be treated as a cautionary measure (seeing as most of the weapons in the war come from outside of Sudan), and instead of putting additional sanctions on Sudan that don’t help for that same reason, they should be placed specifically on separate entities and individuals trafficking weapons into Sudan. By creating foreign disengagement through limiting the external influx of weapons, it would force the RSF and SAF to settle on a real cease-fire: with a lack of weaponry, progress in the war would not be as “fruitful” in the way the generals want it to be. This cease-fire, if utilized correctly, could be the gateway civilian organizations need to restore rightful rule.
Stand up for Sudan, and award it the media attention it deserves
If you made it this far as a reader, you’re probably wondering what you can do to support the people of Sudan. Guess what? You’re already helping by just reading this. In this war, as with any other, citizens of involved external actors play a bigger role than we think. One of the key reasons why the U.S. hasn’t done more for Sudan is simply because we don’t care, or more accurately, we often crave the comfort of blissful ignorance. So what does it look like to care, what does it look like to be aware, and why does it matter? If we bring mass attention to a subject and make it an important issue, politicians will follow to win our vote. Take, for example, the tragedy that was the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, which, even though gun violence has increased since then, prompted a spike in gun safety laws at the state level due to public outcry. Even more recently, in light of the media response and unity prompted by the atrocities occurring in Gaza, democratic candidates have swiftly adopted anti-American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) campaign strategies. The point is that when we not only see injustice but act on it through speaking up, social media interactions, and even protests, the government listens and provides aid through policy, action, or funding because they have to. Remember, we hold the power in deciding who gets elected.
Now, I don’t expect you to donate immediately after reading this, but I do expect you to care, be an advocate for Sudan, and correct misconceptions that will arise. As you’re reading this very line, there are over half a million people trapped in the capital city of North Kordofan, El Obeid. As the RSF and SAF’s drones destroy another water pump and a new child dies of hunger, experts have predicted El Obeid could surpass the level of severity present in El Fasher. Pause and think back to the idea of selective humanitarianism. This is not just about Sudan. It’s about the historical overlooking of conflicts in the continent of Africa. Remember Sudan, but also learn about South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and many more. With that, I leave you with one final question. What will you do?





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