By Andrew Park
Signed into law amid movements to empower the disenfranchised, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 marked an unprecedented leap in federal control over voting. The law, and the legal framework that the federal government accepted to enact the law, was fundamentally rooted in the idea that the federal government ought to put limits on state voting norms when necessary. The U.S. Constitution lays this understanding clearly in Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, working as a base to standardize voting. The VRA used this idea to block racist obstacles that disenfranchised many in the South and further democratize the public. Recently, the Supreme Court offered a new perspective on the Voting Rights Act, which some say “dismantles” landmark protections for voters. This case, known as Louisiana v. Callais, has thus brought national attention to a Roberts Court that seems to take a uniquely reactionary stance. However, while direct measures, such as weakening the Voting Rights Act, seem to clearly restrict national voting rights, the split Roberts Court is driving a different kind of shift. Rather than just narrowing voting rights, recent rulings reveal a broader trend toward decentralizing federal oversight and appointing state legislatures and governments as the primary referees of elections.
The majority conservative decision of Louisiana v. Callais indeed comes across as reducing protections given to minorities and their districts, but it may be better understood as an anti-federal decision. The main aspect of the VRA that Louisiana v. Callais dismantles is racial gerrymandering, which is originally prohibited under Section 2 of the VRA. However, the Court’s decision essentially cuts the boundary of the Section, fundamentally unburdening the states when they create congressional districts. This case relates back to a 2013 case, Shelby County v. Holder, in which the Court decided that the formula used in choosing which districts to federally control with the VRA was unconstitutional. Thus, it became much harder to enact federal top-down limitations on districts. Similarly, in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), the Court decided that policing political gerrymandering by states was not a job for the Court, due to the complexities and standardless nature of congressional districts. Each of these Supreme Court cases can be criticised as a “loss” for federal voting rights, but can also be seen as the Court relinquishing some national rights in exchange for state-level liberty. In other words, the court argues that these actions are going past the federal government’s role.
One may argue that the decentralizing trajectory of the aforementioned cases makes sense as they come from the conservative aisle of the court, one that traditionally prefers a smaller federal government and robust state government. However, the idea holds constant with the liberal aisle of the court as well. In these cases, by limiting the powers of the federal government on what it can limit, the Supreme Court yet again shows its affinity towards an anti-federal framework. Early in 2026, the Supreme Court decided to uphold a Missouri law that extended ballot collection time past election day, giving the green light to states that had differing voting norms. In general, it also protected mail-in voting and leniency towards the time which mail-in ought to happen. While fundamentally similar to the previous cases, the decision included the three current liberal justices. Similarly, the Court, in a 7-2 decision, decided to hold a minor injunction on USPS changes to voting by the executive branch. The majority of the Court reasoned it on respecting the status quo, but the decision also reflects that the Court wants to restrain the executive branch from such top-down revisions. Ultimately, these two cases uphold a federalized (decentralized) form of voting. The national push for limiting voting processes, mainly by President Trump, was rejected by the Court, opting to maintain this state-first system.
When we look at the Supreme Court and the decisions by the liberal and conservative aisles, it may initially appear unrelated, or even contradictory. One could ask, why does the court remove voting rights one day and protect them another day? However, it is important to understand that they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the figurative ebb and flow are structural extensions of the same principle. Therefore, it can be true that SCOTUS limits federal VRA rights while upholding state-level voting rights protections. However, it does change who holds the power of deciding how we vote.
The ultimate consequence of this jurisprudence is that the federal government is no longer the primary referee of American democracy. The power to define both the boundaries of congressional districts and the mechanics of casting a ballot has effectively returned to state capitols, and thus local power structures. As a result, national voting rights have yielded to a decentralized framework where ballot access is no longer guaranteed by uniform federal standards, but determined almost entirely by the outcomes of state and local elections.





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